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Abstract 
Since 2006, according to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, the largest portion of people in 
Northern Ireland identify themselves as neither Unionist nor Nationalist but as ‘Neither’. This fact is 
difficult to tally with the patterns of polarised election results and the narratives of a ‘culture war’ that 
dominate most analyses of contemporary Northern Ireland. This article examines the existence of this 
large portion of the population in Northern Ireland who reject the identities upon which the 1998 Good 
Friday (Belfast) Agreement is centred. We find that those identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist 
are predominantly female, they come from all religious backgrounds, all age groups, all national identities 
(though predominantly both British and Irish). The clear majority of those who identify as Neither 
Nationalist nor Unionist appear to be rejecting what is on offer from the political parties in Northern 
Ireland. The article concludes that the 1998 Agreement has created the conditions for a growing number 
of people to identify as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist, but at the same time it makes the emergence of 
any strong alternative, ‘third way’ type of politics difficult to envisage.  
 
The 1998 Agreement Paradox 
The signing of the 1998 Agreement has been identified as a seminal moment, marking the end 
of a conflict that had come to define Northern Ireland in terms of its conflicting communities: 
Catholic/Irish/Nationalist and Protestant/British/Unionist respectively. As such, the narrative of 
two fundamentally distinct communities has become central to efforts at establishing peace 
(Taylor, 2009). The ‘all-island and all-Ireland cross-border institutions, and institutions linking 
the two sovereign governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland in confederal ways’ 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2009) make explicit the interconnection between communal, national 
and political identity that is assumed to exist and, crucially, to be of greater significance than all 
other identities. It is implied, therefore, that Unionism and Nationalism are more than political 
ideologies – they are also traditions, with cultural roots.  
This means that, whereas one would expect that contemporary political ideologies are likely to 
evolve and respond to a changing context, tying Unionism and Nationalism intrinsically to 
cultural and communal identities gives them the status of ‘communities’ and this allows them to 
be considered as fundamentally unchangeable. Indeed, much has been made, in the 
implementation of the Agreement, of the need to uphold and respect the integrity of ‘both 
communities’ and ‘two traditions’ (The Agreement, 1998, emphasis added). 
Importantly, the Agreement does not assume the creation of an ‘alternative’ identity or a 
‘mixed’ middle ground. This can be seen in the provision for a Border Poll, which was so 
important for gaining the support of Nationalist parties for the Agreement (Mac Ginty, 2003; 
Hayes and McAllister, 2001). By having the possibility of a referendum on Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status written into the Agreement, the presumption appears to be that there will be 
at some point in the future a majority in favour of Irish unity. Such an assessment assumes that 
the growth of the Catholic population relative to those in the diverse Christian denominations 
grouped under the heading ‘Protestant’ would mean that there would be a corresponding growth 
in the portion of population seeking Irish unity. However, there are two problems with this 
assumption. The first is that to be Catholic is not necessarily to self-identify as a Nationalist and 
it is certainly not inevitable that you hold ambitions for Irish unity. The second is that it 
disregards the fact that so many within Northern Ireland do not identify with either Unionism or 
Nationalism. In fact, four out of every ten people in Northern Ireland to describe themselves as 
Neither Unionist nor Nationalist.  
It is this group that this article concentrates on. The research we present here centres on data 
from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT), which has been conducted annually 
(with the exception of 2011) by ARK (Queen’s University Belfast and Ulster University) since 
1998, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. Most fundamentally, we seek to 
identify whether the decision to identify as belonging to Neither of these communities is, 
overall, a ‘positive’ sign of confidence in the post-conflict dispensation or a ‘negative’ sign of 
disengagement from it.  
 
Do the ‘two communities’ really exist? 
The reason why the Agreement assumes the existence of a binary divide and places it at the 
heart of the ‘settlement’ is that there is plenty of historical and sociological evidence to show 
that opinions among respondents who are Catholic and those who are Protestant diverge 
significantly on political matters relating to the Irish border and national sovereignty (Todd, 
2010). Catholic and Protestant can often be more significant variables in contemporary political 
or sociological analysis than age, gender or class (Evans and Tonge, 2013; Hayes and 
McAllister, 2015); opinion on Brexit is a good illustration of this (Garry, 2016). Different 
traditions do exist in Northern Ireland, but is it accurate to claim they are contained within only 
two blocs? 
A quite straightforward means of challenging the ‘two communities’ thesis is to look at the 
relative size of these ‘blocs’. Data from the 2017 NILT (fieldwork was carried out between 
September 2017 and early February 2018, and 1,203 adults were interviewed) shows that, by 
bringing together a diversity of Christian denominations under the heading ‘Protestant’, the size 
of the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland is almost equal. This survey data 
is close to the findings of the 2011 census (which had 41% Catholic, 42% Protestant, 16% No 
Religion or not stated, and 1% other, see NISRA, 2012). What it also shows, of course, is that 
almost a quarter of respondents identify as being neither Catholic nor Protestant (19%).  
A similar impression is gained from a different question on political identity in Northern Ireland 
– one that is often assumed to replicate the Catholic/Protestant distinction – in that we see here 
too a third category of strong significance. Almost half of respondents identify as being Neither 
Unionist nor Nationalist (45% in the NILT survey of 2017). The scale of this response 
demonstrates that the ‘No Religion’ category does not, on its own, explain the existence of the 
‘Neither’ population, but rather that some Catholics and Protestants also self-identify as such. 
This is not a new phenomenon. Data from the NILT show a trend of fairly steady growth of the 
proportion of the population claiming to be Neither Unionist nor Nationalist, although there has 
been some fluctuation in this since a peak of 48% in 2012. It is now quite apparent that the 
largest proportion of the population do not identify with either of the two predominant labels in 
Northern Ireland politics. Indeed, the growth of this group over time would suggest that it could 
be worth considering a new distinction in Northern Ireland between those who identify as 
Unionist and Nationalist, and those who identify as Neither (Figure 1). 
 
  
Figure 1. The proportion of respondents identifying as Unionist, Nationalist and Neither (NILT, 1998-
2017) 
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This could be the manifestation of a phenomenon identified by Baka et al. (2012), namely that, 
rather than reflecting pre-existing ‘neutrality’, the design of the question itself could be 
producing ambiguity. In some ways, the offering of an option to be ‘Neither’ Unionist nor 
Nationalist is like offering a middle point in a Likert Scale. The decision to pick that middle 
point could be used to convey a lack of knowledge or a degree of uncertainty. But it could also 
reflect internal dilemmas on the part of the respondent (for example, the perception of negative 
associations with the other options) or it could mark a decisive rejection of the assumptions 
behind the question itself (e.g. that there is a binary divide) (Baka et al., 2012). By looking in 
more detail at who is ascribing themselves to this ‘Neither’ category, we hope to offer some 
insights into whether those self-reporting as Neither can be classified as having some group 
features or whether it is merely an articulation of dissatisfaction, protest or rejection. We would 
suggest that if there are consistent patterns in those designating as ‘Neither’ over the course of 
the twenty-year period, then it is more likely we can talk about a ‘group’, if not a community, 
and test this for its political significance. 
 
Do the Neithers share common identity traits?  
In this section, we wish to interrogate the question of who is a ‘typical’ ‘Neither’. In this we will 
look at the usual variables of sex, age and religion, but we will also note some points on which 
there are consistently significant differences between those who are Neither and those who are 
Nationalist and Unionist.  
Predominantly female  
NILT data shows that women have always been more likely than men to identify as Neither 
Unionist nor Nationalist. The growth in support for Neither has occurred across both men and 
women (a rise of 10 percentage points among men and 13 among women), but gender has 
become a more significant variable over the two decades since the 1998 Agreement. 61% of 
those identifying as Neither in 2017 are female. This is notable because sex is not a significant 
variable in support for Unionism or Nationalism (around 53% of those identifying in each 
category are male) (NILT, 2017). We know that nationalism itself is highly gendered and that 
nationalist movements are dominated by masculine interests and ideologies (Yuval-Davis, 1997; 
Nagel, 1998), and yet this does not in itself suggest a passive role for women in nationalist 
movements. There is much research to show that women have tended to have been written-out 
of their active role in Nationalist and Unionist mobilisation and conflict – and peace building – 
in Northern Ireland (Gilmartin, 2015; McDowell, 2006). For women to constitute such a large 
portion of those identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist suggests that the rejection of the 
Unionist/Nationalist typology may also be associated with a rejection of the type of macho, 
patriarchal politics that is still quite predominant in Northern Ireland (Ashe, 2007; Stapleton and 
Wilson, 2014).  
 
Non-religious are not predominant among those identifying as ‘Neither’ Unionist nor 
Nationalist 
Because of the association between Unionism/Nationalism and Protestantism/Catholicism in 
Northern Ireland, it is natural to assume that those who don’t identify with either political 
ideology are likely to be non-religious. In which case, we would expect to see the rise of the 
Neither category being in parallel with a rise in the category of those saying they have No 
Religion. By comparing the data on this over the twenty years that followed the 1998 
Agreement, we see that the level of support for Neither (from 33% in 1998 to 41% in 2017, with 
highs of 46-47%) has grown at about the same pace as the rise of No Religion (9% in 1998 to 
19% in 2017) (Figure 2). It is notable that the growth of those saying they have No Religion is 
steadier than those who are Neither Unionist nor Nationalist. This is likely to be because an 
individual’s decision about religious belief (in contrast to his or her political identity) is unlikely 
to be affected by external context and events.  
 
Figure 2. The proportion of NILT respondents in different religious and political categories of identity 
(NILT, 1998-2017) 
 
Looking in more detail at this data we see that, in the space of twenty years, the proportion of 
non-religious saying they are Neither Unionist nor Nationalist has plateaued (at around 62% 
from a high of 74% in 2007). In contrast, there has been a trend of increasing support for 
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identifying as ‘Neither’ among Catholics since 1998. The data from 2017 indicates that almost a 
half of Catholics now identify as Neither, compared to just under one in every three Protestants. 
Within the category of ‘Neither’, we see 40% are Catholic, 30% Protestant and 30% of No 
Religion (Figure 3).  
  
 
Figure 3. Religious breakdown within each of the three main categories of political identity (NILT, 2017) 
 
To be ‘Neither’ is not just a trend among the younger generations 
Several studies of post-Agreement Northern Ireland have identified increasing differences 
between political and voting choices across generations. Tilley and Evans (2011) see this as a 
consequence of the changing political environment in which the generations have been 
socialised, including an increase in choice of political parties (Evans and Duffy, 1997). Looking 
at the proportion of each generation group self-identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist 
since the Agreement, we see that it has become increasingly popular among the youngest adults. 
That said, although the oldest are still the least likely to identify as Neither, there has been a 
steady increase in the proportion of the over 65s who do so. It is worth noting the great leap 
among the 45-54 year olds from 2013 to 2017 who identify as Neither. The data becomes a little 
too thin to extrapolate too much about change within cohorts over time but it is notable that the 
generation who were most likely to describe themselves as Neither at the time of the signing of 
the Agreement (i.e. those then aged 25-44) have become increasingly likely to define 
themselves as such on its twentieth anniversary (Figure 4).  
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 Figure 4. Proportion of each age group identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist (NILT, 1998-2017) 
 
When we look at the age profile of those identifying as Neither in 2017, it is therefore perhaps 
not too surprising that it is spread fairly evenly across the generations. If we compare the age 
profile of Neithers to those of Unionists and Nationalists we note three points. First the age 
group 45-54 constitute a larger portion of support for Neither than it does for either Unionist or 
Nationalist designation. Secondly, the Neither designation has proportionately larger support 
among the youngest cohort and significantly smaller support among the oldest cohort than 
Unionist. Indeed, according to NILT 2017, 42% of those self-identifying as Unionist are over 65 
(compared to 29% of those identifying as Nationalist and 20% of those identifying as Neither). 
Without overstating the case, this indicates that the political identities of Nationalist and 
Unionist are ones that the oldest generation are the most comfortable with. Similarly, to 
describe oneself as ‘Neither’ Unionist nor Nationalist is not just a trend confined to the youngest 
generations. We consider below whether this might have any significance for the future of 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status.  
 
Neithers are from across a spectrum of British-Irish identities 
Academic scholarship is beginning to examine the growth of the category of ‘Northern Irish’ as 
an identity of meaning in Northern Ireland (McNicholl, 2018; Tonge and Gomez, 2015). 
Interestingly, McNicholl (2018) concludes that to identify as Northern Irish is not – as the 
constitutional arrangements of the Agreement might suggest – a synthesis of British and Irish 
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identities but rather represents a rejection of them. The census in 2011 returned 21% of people 
claiming Northern Irish as their national identity (NISRA, 2012). The question on this is not 
offered in NILT so we are unable to assess the relationship between the ‘Northern Irish’ and 
‘Neither’ identitied; instead we can look at the question offered on British and Irish identity, 
which offers a spectrum of exclusivity at either end, with ‘equally’ British and Irish identity 
offered as a mid-way point. It also offers the category of ‘Other’ than British or Irish.  
One of the reasons behind the ‘two communities’ thesis is that Catholics are much less likely to 
say they have a British identity than Protestants, and Protestants are much less likely to say they 
have an Irish identity than Catholics. There is still some cross-over, however, which belies the 
idea of a stark binary. According to NILT 2017 data, 51% of Protestants claim some Irish 
identity and 35% of Catholics claim some British identity, although in both cases, this is 
predominantly as a ‘minor’ or ‘equal’ identity rather than the major identity.  If, instead of 
religious background, we look at political identities, there are some interesting patterns of 
national identities. Of those describing themselves as Unionist, 44% claim some Irish identity 
and 52% say they are exclusively British. Of those describing themselves as Nationalist, 26% 
claim some British identity, but 72% describe themselves as exclusively Irish (compared to 54% 
of Catholics). It is therefore possible to conclude that the most exclusively connected identities 
are Nationalist and Irish. A ‘Neither’ political identity is compatible with a wide spread of 
national identities, including only British, only Irish and equally both.  Indeed, the largest 
category for national identity among Neithers is ‘equally British and Irish’. This shows that 
national identity is not as exclusively associated with Neithers in the way that it is with 
Unionists and Nationalists (Figure 5).  
 
 
 Figure 5. Self-reported national identities held within each category of political identity (NILT, 2017) 
 
To conclude this section: those identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist are 
predominantly female, they come from all religious backgrounds (though predominantly 
Catholic), all age groups, all national identities (though predominantly both British and Irish). 
Although we can see stark differences between Neithers, Unionists and Nationalists, those 
common traits alone appear to point to a ‘halfway house’ between Unionists and Nationalists 
rather than any distinctive community. It is worth turning, therefore, to a brief examination of 
whether they share common experiences in socialisation that may affect their choice to reject 
the traditional political identities.   
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Do the ‘Neithers’ share common experience? 
‘Neithers’ are more likely to be highly qualified, with an experience of mixed schooling 
The relationship between education and nationalistic values has a long and complex history. In 
the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, education was seen to play a crucial role in 
helping to construct a sense of national identity and belonging (Green, 2013; Özkirimli, 2010; 
Hroch, 2000; Reisner, 1922). The perceived relationship between education and 
nationalism/xenophobia has been altered significantly in the twenty-first century, as research 
has shown that, as levels of education increase, individuals are less likely to support or vote for 
radical right parties (Givens, 2017; Lazaridis and Campani, 2017; McManus, 2016; Hjerm, 
2001). Indeed, using data from the International Social Survey Programme, Hjerm (2001: 37) 
found that ‘levels of nationalist sentiment as well as of xenophobia decrease with increasing 
levels of education’ – a trend confirmed by Coeender and Scheepers (2003).   
With this in mind, it might be expected that those who identify as Neither Unionist or 
Nationalist in Northern Ireland – as a determinedly non-atavistic identity – would possess a high 
level of education. However, a more complex picture emerges from the NILT data. Whilst those 
qualified to degree level or above make up the highest proportion (26%) of those identifying as 
Neither Unionist nor Nationalist, one-fifth of the group had left school with no qualifications 
and a further 21% having achieved GCSE level but less than A Level. That said, between 1998 
and 2017, the proportion of those identifying as Neither who left school with no qualifications 
was consistently smaller than that of Unionists and Nationalists.  
A further consideration in exploring the Neither grouping centred on whether they had attended 
an integrated or mixed school. Integrated education emerged in the 1970s as fears were voiced 
that Northern Ireland’s segregated education system was a significant contributing factor to the 
sectarian divide (Hayes, McAllister, & Dowds, 2007). The integrated education sector has not 
developed to the extent that many had hoped– despite a promise in the Agreement (1998) for 
‘initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated education and mixed housing’. In the academic 
year 2017/2018 only 8.7% of Northern Ireland’s school population were attending integrated 
post-primary schools and this figure falls to 5.9% at primary level (NISRA, 2018). Analysis of 
NILT from 1998 to 2017 reveals that, indeed, those in the Neither category are more likely than 
Unionists or Nationalists to have attended a mixed religion school at some point, with 16% of 
Neither-identifying respondents having done so compared to 8 and 9% of Nationalists and 
Unionists respectively.  
    
Neithers are more likely to be in paid employment than Unionists and Nationalists 
As with education, the relationship between social class and nationalist politics is complex 
(Breuilly, 1993; Gidron and Hall, 2017). Links between social class and increased nationalist 
sentiment in Northern Ireland have often been framed around the fact that working-class areas 
suffered disproportionally from the violence of the Troubles (Fay et al., 1998). It might be 
expected, therefore, that those who identify as ‘Neither’ Unionist or Nationalist would come 
predominantly from the ABC1 social classification. Again, the findings present a more complex 
picture. In 1998, there was a question on type of employment; this enables us to see that there is 
little difference between Unionist, Nationalist and Neither in terms of the spread and proportion 
from professional, to manual to unskilled occupations represented in each category. By 2017, 
the largest proportion of those identifying as Neither (40%) are employed in ‘Higher or Lower 
managerial professional occupations’.  
In terms of household income, the category of Neither has a larger portion (6%) of those on the 
lowest income (below £5,200 p.a.) than Protestants or Unionists or those with No Religion. We 
also, conversely, see that it has the highest proportion of those on the highest income bracket; in 
fact, the proportion on the £52,000+ income bracket was the largest in the Neither category 
(17%). NILT (2017) also shows that a significant proportion of those identifying as Neither 
(31.7%) currently own their home outright; this compares to 31% Catholics and 46% of 
Protestants, and just 26% of those with No Religion. This no doubt reflects the age profile of 
each of these groups.  
On a different tack, 40% of those identifying as Neither are employed in a full-time capacity 
with 14.6% working part-time. 20.8% of these respondents stated that they had ‘Retired from 
paid work’ (which corroborates the 20% of ‘Neithers’ who say they are over 65). The data also 
shows that a higher proportion of Neithers are consistently in paid employment. Whereas there 
was just a small difference in the proportion of Neithers in paid employment compared to 
Unionists and Nationalists in 1998, this gap has grown steadily in the past twenty years. In 
2017, 55% of Neithers are in paid employment, compared to 40 and 42% respectively for 
Unionists and Nationalists (NILT, 2017). This is significant as it offers a slightly different 
perspective on the matter of household income – paid employment offers a lot more than simply 
income in terms of things that can shape a person’s political viewpoint and identity. This relates 
to wider questions about what is needed to transform Northern Ireland into a more stable, less 
conflictual society (Shirlow and Shuttleworth, 1999; Murtagh and Shirlow, 2012). A higher 
proportion of the Neither grouping tends to be either in full or part-time employment or in 
education, compared to Unionists and Nationalists.  
  
 
Much more likely to have lived outside Northern Ireland 
There is one social factor that appears to be highly significant in affecting the likelihood of 
people identifying as Neither: living outside Northern Ireland. We see that it has become more 
common for survey respondents to have lived outside Northern Ireland for more than 6 months, 
but there is a striking difference between the trends among respondents identifying as Unionist, 
Nationalist and Neither. People identifying as Neither are much more likely to have lived 
outside Northern Ireland and this variable has increased in its significance over the two decades 
since the 1998 Agreement. In 1998, one third of Neithers had lived outside Northern Ireland; 
this figure had risen to 42% by 2017 (amid a larger cohort, too). This contrasts with a rise from 
16% to just 19% of Unionists and 24% to 26% of Nationalists. Perhaps this is the most telling 
feature of all – that some substantial experience of socialisation outside of Northern Ireland 
offers a perspective that makes the traditional binary divide of political identity appear less 
appealing and relevant to an individual. Whilst there has been excellent research on the 
experiences of migration outside Northern Ireland (Cairns et al., 2013), and of contact with 
‘others’ inside Northern Ireland (Tausch et al., 2007), the question of the political and civic 
engagement of ‘returnees’ to the region is a subject worthy of further analysis. 
 
What would ‘Neithers’ vote in a border poll?  
Perhaps, given the consociational set-up of Northern Ireland, the most important question to be 
asked of those who are Neither Unionist nor Nationalist is how they would vote in a future 
border poll. It is worth recognising that, whilst the critical line of competition according to the 
1998 Agreement is about the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, survey data has 
consistently shown that support for remaining in the UK (with devolution) is the preferred 
outcome for a clear majority of the population. Support for Irish unity peaked in 2006, just prior 
to the restoration of devolution after the St Andrews Agreement. This suggests that an active 
Assembly and Executive is good for Unionism, and that without it support for Irish unity grows. 
A closer look at the data also shows that the fall in support for the Union occurs quite 
significantly in 2017. It is surely relevant that this survey not only occurred after the triggering 
of Article 50 for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (something rejected by 56% of the 
population in Northern Ireland) but also that, by this point, the devolved Executive and 
Assembly were not functioning due to a dispute between the DUP and Sinn Féin. Looking at the 
data (Figure 6), it seems that most of those who moved away from supporting devolution within 
the Union (a drop of 7 points) went to being undecided (Don’t Knows rose by 4 points), rather 
than support for Irish unity (a rise of 1 point) or direct rule (a rise of 2 points).  
 Figure 6. Preferred long-term outcome for Northern Ireland (NILT, 1998-2017) 
 
Looking at the constitutional preference over time for those identifying as Neither, we note that 
there has not been any dramatic change in the spread of support within this group for the various 
options since 1998. Devolution within the UK is consistently the favoured outcome – three 
times more so than Irish unification, and twice that of the second most-popular answer, that of 
‘Don’t Know’. A fall in support for devolution appears to lead to an increase in the number 
answering ‘Don’t Know’ rather than support for any substantive alternative. This indicates a 
lack of cross-over from supporting the UK union towards supporting Irish unity. If people who 
are Neither Unionist nor Nationalist have doubts about the Union, they move to ‘Don’t Know’. 
Admittedly, the options offered in the NILT survey are conservative; ‘Other’ is not spelled out 
(it could be Joint Authority between Dublin and London, or a federal Irish state with distinct 
arrangements for Northern Ireland, for example) but it is not a popular option among Neithers 
(3% support in 2017). Instead, one in four Neithers say they do not know their preferred 
constitutional outcome for Northern Ireland.  In sum, we can say that those identifying as 
Neither are more likely than Unionists and Nationalists to be undecided, but they are 
predominantly in favour of the union.   
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Constitutional preference (all)
Remain part of the UK [post-2007 Q with devolution]
Remain part of the UK with direct rule
Reunify with the rest of Ireland
Don't know
What is the political significance of the Neither group?  
We turn now to the question of whether those identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist 
have any political significance for the future of Northern Ireland. Elections in Northern Ireland 
have been historically dominated by the two major blocs of Nationalism and Unionism with the 
Other largely reflected in the votes cast for the middle-ground Alliance Party. This was evident 
in the first election for the new Northern Ireland Assembly, held on the 25 June 1998, which 
was dominated by the four big parties – SDLP and Sinn Féin representing nationalism and UUP 
and DUP representing unionism. The Assembly election of 1998 saw Unionist parties with 55% 
of the seats, Nationalist parties with 42% and Others with just 8%. This support for Other 
parties is significantly less than we might expect, given that 33% of respondents in the NILT of 
1998 identified as Neither Nationalist nor Unionist. In fact, it is immediately apparent that to be 
Neither Unionist nor Nationalist does not mean that you vote for an ‘alternative’ or middle 
ground party such as Alliance.  
Closer analysis of the parties supported by those identifying as Neither in 1998 shows that the 
most popular was the SDLP (19%), with Alliance receiving just under 15% support from this 
group. Indeed, looking at patterns of support for parties from those identifying as Neither 
reveals that support for Alliance has remained consistently steady (in 2017 it was 17%) even as 
the size of the Neither cohort itself has grown. The most significant change is seen in the 
decline in support for the SDLP from a 2007 high of 23% to just 8% in 2017. We note that this 
is not at the gain of any other particular party (Sinn Féin, the DUP and the UUP all have even 
lower levels of support among the Neithers). Instead there has been a rise in the proportion of 
Neithers offering the answer ‘Don’t Know’ in response to the question on which party they feel 
closest to (10% in 2017). More significantly, we note that the most popular answer to this 
question from Neithers has always been ‘None’, and that this has risen from 22% in 1998, to 
30% in 2007, to 40% in 2017. The clear majority of those who identify as Neither Nationalist 
nor Unionist are, therefore, rejecting what is on offer from the political parties in Northern 
Ireland.  
This is perhaps reflected in the turnout figures for elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
although even here, the picture is complex. The optimism generated by the Agreement led to a 
high turnout for the first Assembly election with 68.8 per cent of the electorate casting their 
votes. Thereafter, there is a steady decline with turnout at the 2007 election at 62.3 per cent and 
a record low of 54.9% recorded in 2016. This trend was bucked in 2017, however, with 64.8 per 
cent casting their votes amid heightened communal tensions over Brexit, the Irish Language Act 
and the collapse of the Assembly. 
Nevertheless, even at 64.8 per cent, this still means that approximately 35 per cent of the 
electorate did not vote, with that figure at just over 45 per cent only ten months previously. This 
would certainly suggest a significant proportion of the electorate – corresponding with the 
Neither category – has become detached from the traditional narratives of the main parties 
representing Nationalism and Unionism. 
That they are choosing to not to vote is also of significance and this is especially true given the 
wider range of political parties that are now standing candidates for Northern Ireland elections. 
In addition to the four main parties – DUP, Sinn Féin, UUP and SDLP – there is also an 
increased presence for parties such as Alliance and the Greens, who have both won a modest 
seat increase in recent elections. Their gains, however, do not reflect what appears to be a much 
wider detachment from Northern politics as represented by the Neithers. 
Nor does the gains made by the radical socialist party People Before Profit Alliance (PBP) who, 
in securing two seats in the 2016 election, appear to have made their gains by appealing to 
elements of the republican community that have grown detached from Sinn Féin. That this is the 
case, would appear to pour cold water on the theory that a ‘normalised’ political culture in 
Northern Ireland would facilitate the rise of a left wing politics that could unite the working 
classes from across the political divide (Ref).  
How then, might this growing “Neither” population be best explained in political terms? We 
would suggest that it is best understood within the context of political apathy (Refs).  
Political apathy is a common feature of politics in Western democracies (Ref).     
Alternative politics is thriving but outside electoral politics.  
Rejection of the labels, specifically nationalist,  
Unwilling to jump from nationalist to unionist label.  
 
      
 
Conclusion 
The 1998 Agreement anticipated the creation of a more tolerant, inclusive society in which 
traditional divisions became less important. In many ways, it created conditions for this and we 
have seen the growth in citizens self-identifying in a way that rejects the label of both Unionist 
and Nationalist. But at the same time, the Agreement also created political institutions and a 
political environment (e.g. prospect of border poll) that reinforce that ‘traditional’ divide (Mac 
Ginty, 2003). In fact, it gives it far more weight than it ever had before. Interestingly, it seems 
that those identifying as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist are not advocating an alternative 
vision or option for the future of Northern Ireland. A sizeable proportion of them might say that 
their indecision or lack of interest about the constitutional question is their position, not an 
absence of one. Yet most of them hold what could legitimately be termed unionist preferences 
without wishing to be labelled Unionist per se. The biggest issue seems to be with the label of 
Unionism rather than the fact of the Union. For such reasons, it would appear timely to consider 
an alternative to the binary option of UK Union/Irish Unity. The centrism of the Alliance party 
has struggled to gain ground whilst that binary remains the only vision of what is on offer for a 
future Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2018). This challenge only grows more acute in the context of 
Brexit. The predominant competing visions for Northern Ireland’s future seem increasingly 
unrepresentative and over-simplistic compared to the type of society that many consider 
themselves to be living in and contributing to. 
And are the people who identify as Neither Unionist nor Nationalist more likely to be creating a 
‘new’ Northern Ireland or to be, in effect, opting-out from it? The ‘typical’ person identifying as 
Neither is more likely than either Unionists or Nationalists to be: young, female, of both British 
and Irish identity, supporting No Party, having lived outside Northern Ireland, to have some 
qualification (especially at the highest levels), to have gone to a mixed School, to be in paid 
employment and to have a high income. There are findings in this paper that would counter the 
assumptions made by many. In sum, looking in more detail at those who conscientiously say 
they have Neither Unionist nor Nationalist identities above all else reveals the complexity of 
Northern Ireland society and the inadequacy of the ‘two communities’ thesis. Political 
arrangements that appear more relevant and representative of contemporary social needs are far 
more likely to generate political interest (Van Deth and Elff, 2004). Twenty years after the 1998 
Agreement, perhaps Northern Ireland is ready for a revolution from the centre: to make 
Neither/Nor into All/Together.  
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